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case, the court did not find this necessary element of any outward sign or affirmative act which would have served as notice
of terminating the precarious possession and of starting a new
adverse possession as owner.
SALE

Joseph Dainow*
Property Description
In the case of Williams v. Bowie Lumber Company1 the plaintiffs were descendants of one Martin who had conveyed to one
Dowman "all the property owned by him in the Parish of Lafourche" (except certain described units), and they now claim
ownership on the basis of inadequate description of the property.
Since heirs are included within the term "parties," it was held
that they could not attack the conveyance of their ancestor, because an omnibus description is binding between the parties.
Other cases which had held conveyances invalid for lack of adequate description were distinguished as involving the rights of
third persons. If Martin would have made a subsequent sale of
the same property to a third person, with full description and
proper recordation, the claim of such person might have come
into the latter category, but that is not what the court had to
consider in the present case.
Merchantable title
Three cases reiterated the rule that a vendor does not have
a right of action for specific performance or for damages against
a vendee who refuses to accept a tendered title if this title is
suggestive of serious litigation.
In the case of Schaub v. O'Quin,2 the title which plaintiff was
offering had been obtained at the private sale of a minor's immovable property, for which the tutor had obtained the undertutor's concurring affidavit instead of ruling him into court as
required by Act 209 of 1932. 3 In the case at bar, the validity of
this title was not in issue and the court could not pass upon it,
but until there was an adjudication as to compliance or substantial compliance there remained the direct possibility of such a
law suit. The title was therefore "suggestive of serious future lit* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 214 La. 750, 38 So.(2d) 729 (1948).

2. 214 La. 424, 38 So. (2d) 63 (1948), noted in (1949)
REvIEW 563.
3. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4844-4847.5.
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igation 4 and could not support a demand for specific performance.
Similarly, in Lear v. Great National Development Company,5
the court held that the defendant could not be forced to accept
a tract of land where title to a part of it rested upon the plaintiff's acquisitive prescription. The question of this prescriptive
title was not before the court, nor were the necessary adverse
parties; and since it could not be answered conclusively without a lawsuit, the title was "suggestive of future litigation" which
precluded it from being merchantable.
Still another situation, in which specific performance was
denied, was presented in Doll v. Meyer. 6 The question of the
merchantability of the title to the property depended upon an
interpretation of Act 106 of 19347 which is designed to quiet tax
titles in accordance with Section 11 of Article 10 of the 1921 Constitution. The plaintiff had acquired the property from the state
at public auction after it had been adjudicated to the state
for nonpayment of taxes assessed against Romano. Then the
plaintiff had instituted proceedings and obtained a judgment in
accordance with the provisions of Act 106 of 1934, Romano and
his heirs being represented by a curator ad hoc. However, the
court felt that "we cannot say the title being tendered the defendant is not suggestive of litigation" because Act 106 of 1934
contemplates only tax sales to third persons and not tax adjudications to the state for want of a bidder. Thus, the proceedings
under that statute did not preclude the possibility of a claim
being made by Romano or his heirs, and final judgment was rendered for the defendant.
Warranty against eviction; Homestead Associations
In Hausler v. Nuccio8 the court had occasion to reiterate the
well-established rule that the vendee has a right of action against
the vendor for cancellation of the sale and restitution of partial
payment even though no actual eviction or physical disturbance
has yet taken place. In this connection it may be indicated that
the vendee-plaintiff in such a suit must discharge the burden of
proving that there is an outstanding good title in the third person.
In the present case, the plaintiff did show that part of the prop4. 214 La. 424, 431, 38 So.(2d)

63, 65 (1948).

5. 41 So. (2d) 668 (La. 1949).
6. 214 La. 444, 38 So. (2d) 69 (1948). See also discussion of this case in
section on Taxation, supra p.-.
7. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8502-8504.
8. 214 La. 1069, 39 So. (2d) 734 (1949).
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erty was located on land which constituted a public street in the
City of New Orleans, and judgment was rendered in his favor
even though the city had not made any demands upon him.
There is another aspect of this decision, however, which may
have far-reaching practical repercussions. The real parties in
this case were Nuccio as vendor and Hausler as vendee. But
Hausler had to borrow some money from a homestead association,
and the latter employed the usual sale and resale transaction in
order to obtain the vendor's privilege as a security device in addition to the regular mortgage. The present suit was brought by
Hausler against both Nuccio and the Pelican Homestead Association and the significance of the supreme court's decision is that
it applies to the homestead which alone appealed from the adverse judgment of the lower court.
In view of the prominent part that has been played by the
homestead associations in facilitating the extensive private ownership of homes, there has been a generous legislative policy with
reference to their operation and their necessary regulation. In
one matter particularly, there has been legislative recognition
of a customary practice, and that has been the homestead's vendor's lien and privilege arising from the customary sale and resale transaction." At the same time, in the ordinary case of a
loan, the homestead was usually not considered as the vendor
for other purposes, but rather as the creditor in a pignorative or
security transaction. Consequently, the present decision holding
the homestead responsible for an eviction-despite the routine
clause "without warranty"-on the ordinary vendor's necessary
obligation of warranty 10 will hit the homestead associations a
blow they did not expect, More developments on this point
are likely to follow and may very well be watched carefullyin the homestead practices, in further litigation, and possibly also in the legislature.
Rescission for nonperformance; Testimony outside of contract
In the case of Lohman v. Lonergan" the plaintiff sued a real
estate agent for the recovery of a deposit made as part payment
for the purchase of a property. The plaintiff's contract with the
agent and the owner was in the nature of a mutual promise of
purchase and sale, and contained a special provision stipulating
possession within thirty days of one of the two dwelling units.
9. La. Act 140 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939)

10. Art. 2505, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. 215 La. 406, 40 So.(2d) 801 (1949).

§ 716 et seq.].
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At the end of this period, plaintiff offered to conclude the sale,
provided he could get possession, but the owner had taken no
steps to have the occupying tenant vacate the premises. The
court of appeal's judgment 12 in favor of plaintiff was affirmed on
the ground that the primary motive or cause of the contract was
to obtain within thirty days the possession of which was not tendered; nor was the failure to do so excusably explained. It is
interesting to note, however, that the conclusion regarding the
important significance of the thirty-day possession provision in
the contract was reached by the court mainly on the basis of
13
testimony and evidence outside of the contract itself.
Lesion beyond moiety
The Civil Code provides a number of protective devices both
for the vendor and the vendee. One of the special protections
for the vendor is the relief for lesion in the sale of immovables
where "the vendor has been aggrieved for more than half the
value.' 1 4 A question regarding the scope of the application of
this relief was presented in Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston,
La. The majority held that relief for this kind of lesion was
available to the person who had conveyed a property by a giving
in payment (dation en paiement), and that mineral values'0 are
to be included in determining the true value of the property at
the time of the transfer. This position is grounded on the code
provision that, except as otherwise provided, the giving in payment is governed by the rules of sale' 7 and on the classification
of mineral values as immovable within the meaning of Article
1862.
The dissenting opinion disagrees with the applicability of
lesion to a giving in payment, on the basis of a strict and limited
interpretation of the relevant code provisions. Article 1861 lists
sale but not giving in payment; Articles 1863 and 2664 define the
very narrow limits of lesion in the case of exchange; this type
of law is not susceptible of extension by interpretation; and
the specific restrictive language of these articles should not be
superseded by a broad interpretation of Article 2659 which is
12.
13.
30 So.
230.
14.
15.
16.
17.

33 So.(2d) 705 (La. App. 1948).
See Art. 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. Lamar v. Young, 211 La. 837,
(2d) 853 (1947), commented upon in (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW RE:vIEw
Art. 2589, La. Civil Code of 1870.
41 So.(2d) 811 (La. 1949).
For a discussion of this point see section on Mineral Rights, supra p.
Art. 2659, La. Civil Code of 187Q,
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the general incorporation by reference of the rules of sale to a
giving in payment.
From the point of view of legal analysis, both positions can
be considered as well taken, and the question is a close one.
From the point of view of policy, the preference seems to be in
favor of the majority. If lesion were not applicable to giving in
payment, a way would be opened for fraud to defeat this protection intended for a vendor, and the scope of Article 2659 is
cut down beyond the mere differences there referred to; the
way would also be opened to question the applicability of other
rules of sale so as to defeat the stability of sale as well as giving
in payment.
Public records
An unusual application of the principle of public recordation
was made in the case of Humphreys v. Royal."8 In 1936, many
years after a voluntary separation of the spouses, the husband
purchased a tract of land which automatically became a community asset despite his description in the deed as a "single
man." In 1938 he obtained a divorce and in 1941 he. sold the land
to the defendant. In 1946, the plaintiff sought out and purchased
from the ex-wife an undivided one-half interest in this property;
and then instituted the present petitory, action to establish his
title. Although the lower court gave a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, this was annulled and set aside by the supreme court.
The majority opinion is predicated upon the public policy that
any transaction or judgment concerning immovable property cannot affect the rights of third persons unless properly recorded; and
since the 1938 divorce was not recorded in the parish where the
land was situated the defendant was protected in his purchase.
This must be considered either as the purchase from a "single
man" or as from the husband still acting as master of the community. The former would not be a desirable ground on which
to base this decision because it would protect fraudulent self
description in deeds of acquisition; the latter seems rather to be
the basis of the court's position because the lack of recordation
is directed at the divorce decree.
The dissenting opinion acknowledged the public policy of
the registry rule but maintained that in the event of conflict, the
preservation of the community interest was paramount, placing
upon a purchaser the full burden and responsibility of ascertaining the exact marital status and history of the vendor.
18. 41 So.(2d) 220 (La. 1949).
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The majority opinion does not disclose any extent to which
it may have been influenced by the fact that the husband acquired the property seventeen years after the separation, or by what
looked like the prefabricated litigation of the alert plaintiff. On
the other hand it would hardly seem desirable to let a person
derive a benefit from his own failure (or deliberate omission)
to record his divorce judgment. However, the principle of public recordation does reflect one of the strongest policies in Louisiana law, and it should require a very clever and deliberate superior expression to avoid or supersede it.1"
LEASE

Joseph Dainow*
In the case of Lingle v. Wainright,' the lease contract contained one provision (printed) requiring written notice of renewal to lessor prior to a certain date, and also another provision
(typewritten) giving lessee the option of renewal for a fouryear period at a stipulated increased rental. The lessee gave written notice of renewal for the four year period at the higher rental, but sent it later than the date in the first provision; and the
lessor accepted the new rent payments for nearly a year after the
original lease expired. When the lessor sold the property, the
new owner brought this suit to evict the lessee, and the dispute
centered on the question of renewal. By reading both renewal
provisions together and interpreting the contract as a whole, the
court found that the lessor had waived his right to insist on
written notice prior to the designated date, and that there had
been a good renewal for the four-year period.
/

Another question of waiver was presented in the case of
Redon v. Armstrong.2 The lessor sued for cancellation of the lease
on the ground of the lessee's failure to make prompt payment
of a certain monthly rent note. The lessee pleaded that there had
been a waiver of the contract promptness by the lessor's acceptance of several payments a few days late. However, the court
19. Cf. the protection of third person's recorded purchase in conflict
with succession policies in Chachere v. Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So.
321 (1939), noted in (1940) 2 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 387. However, the forced
heirs were given the protection where the third person had only a recorded
option to purchase (as distinguished from a record title) in Thompson v.
Thompson. 211 La. 468, 30 So. (2d) 321 (1947), noted in (1948) 8 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 429.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 215 La. 117, 39 So. (2d) 843 (1949).
2. 215 La. 307, 40 So. (2d) 474 (1949).

